owner slot is now 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 and cannot be changed. The functions mint(), pause(), unpause(), and setBlacklist() are permanently disabled. Maximum supply is locked at 21,000,000 ANET forever. The contract now obeys only its code, equally for every holder.
0x791055A7d52AA392eaE8De04250497f33807E46AVerify: BscScan → Read Contract →
owner() → returns 0x0000…0000.Co-founder stewardship (50% / 50%): @Joel_Dupalco · @Digitalgold1979. Stewards hold tokens as ordinary holders with no on-chain administrative privileges.
0x31438362a7667ce5559500023D025c7c14168B49). The A-Network Layer 1 chain and cash-out escrow remain operator-run today and are scheduled for phased decentralization on the v3.x roadmap.
| # | Milestone | Status | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ANET BEP-20 ownership renounced | ✅ DONE May 24, 2026 |
Token contract on BNB Chain is immutable. Nobody — including founders — can mint, pause, or blacklist. Verify on BscScan. |
| 2 | Bridge escrow → on-chain multi-signer vault | ✅ DONE May 25, 2026 |
The wANET escrow was migrated from a hot EOA to AnetBridgeVault — a custom one-way-sink contract that is stricter than a Gnosis Safe: admin cannot rescue the vault asset, all releases require an EIP-712 signature threshold, and the bridge submitter wallet has zero signing authority. View on BscScan. |
| 3 | Deploy AnetBridgeVault with 2-of-3 EIP-712 signatures | ✅ DONE May 25, 2026 · deploy tx 0x82da7f2a…62c7e |
Smart-contract bridge replaces the custodial relayer. On-chain caps (10k / 50k / 250k ANET per tx / per-recipient-24h / global-24h), on-chain burn-ID dedup, EIP-712 2-of-3 multi-signer release. Signatures are collected on L1 via POST /bridge/burns/:id/sigs from three independent self-hosted signer daemons; the relayer holds no signing keys and can only submit gas. Source · Internal audit. |
| 4 | Founder treasury custody → vault (50% deposited) | ✅ DONE May 25, 2026 |
The @Joel_Dupalco 50% founder allocation — 10,499,798.020348 wANET — was moved from a hot EOA (0xB65B30…6184F) into AnetBridgeVault. wANET held by the founder is now custodied by the 2-of-3 EIP-712 multisig: no single signer (including the founder himself) can release the funds. Vault total post-deposit: ~10.5M wANET. The @Digitalgold1979 mirror 50% deposit is the next milestone. Verify vault balance on BscScan. |
| 5 | 48-hour timelock on vault admin actions | ✅ DONE May 25, 2026 |
Shipped as part of the May 25 AnetBridgeVault deploy. Every admin parameter change (fee bps, fee recipient, signer-set rotation, threshold change, pauser/operator rotation, unpause) goes through scheduleChange → 48-hour wait → executeChange, with a 14-day grace window and bait-and-switch-resistant arg re-hashing. Cancellable via cancelChange(id). Source: TIMELOCK_DELAY = 48 hours in AnetBridgeVault.sol. |
| 6 | AnetSwap ownership → multisig + timelock | 🟡 IN PROGRESS Code shipped May 28, 2026 · awaiting v3.6 deploy |
Contract code complete in v3.6: 48h timelock on every parameter change, 3-role split (admin / pauser / operator), 2-step admin handover, withdrawals admin-only with destination hard-wired to admin so a compromised owner key cannot redirect. See v3.6 changelog. Full deploy runbook published at contracts/DEPLOY_V36_MIGRATION.md. Pending: fresh BSC deploy with Safe multisig as admin + bridge-state migration off the v3.5 contract at 0x1A1AFE5BF1ffDB64aC10958cCe2D06B22Fb47Fb8. Renounce remains a separate downstream milestone (analogous to #10). |
| 7 | Public peer-review program | 🟡 IN PROGRESS Recognition program open May 28, 2026 |
A-Network has neither cash budget for a paid audit firm (USD 15–60k at this scope) nor a discretionary wANET pool to offer as bounty — the founder allocation is reserved for its published economic functions and we will not dilute that commitment. Instead we publish the full audit package (1,170 LOC, frozen commit SHA, source hashes, reproducible build, full threat model) and offer external researchers durable public recognition: credit in the fix commit, credit in the whitepaper changelog, an entry in SECURITY_FINDINGS.md, a pinned project-account acknowledgement for Critical / High findings, and a signed letter of acknowledgement for portfolios. Rules and severity table in SECURITY.md. This is the honest stance: a zero-budget project should not pretend to fund what it cannot fund. Milestone flips to ✅ DONE when at least one external researcher publishes a finding (or a documented zero-finding clean review) against the frozen commit. |
| 8 | L1 multi-validator set (3+ independent operators) | 🟡 IN PROGRESS Recruitment spec published May 28, 2026 |
Public recruitment + technical spec at anet-chain/VALIDATOR_RECRUITMENT_SPEC.md. Phase 2 target = 3 independent operators on 2-of-3 quorum (closes the scorecard but is honestly not yet BFT). Phase 2 is volunteer: no monetary compensation, no wANET grants, no infra reimbursement — A-Network is a zero-budget project and the founder allocation is reserved for its published economic functions. Phase 2 operators receive public attribution, governance voice, and priority eligibility for Phase 3 protocol-level block rewards when they ship. Phase 3 (4 validators, 3-of-4) is the first BFT-capable configuration and the next planned milestone after #8. Pending: two external operators completing onboarding (§6 of the spec). |
| 9 | Open-source bridge relayer & L1 node | 🟡 IN PROGRESS License + governance landed May 28, 2026 |
All three repositories are MIT-licensed (OSI-approved): A-Network-2026/LICENSE, A-Network-2026/pi-backend/LICENSE, anet-chain/LICENSE. Public contribution surface landed: SECURITY.md + CONTRIBUTING.md on both A-Network-2026 and anet-chain, with coordinated-disclosure timelines, safe-harbor language, and per-component scope. Pending: publishing signed release-tag binaries of anet-chain and pi-backend on GitHub Releases with SHA-256 sums so non-builders can verify what they run. |
| 10 | Renounce vault admin role | ⏳ PLANNED | After 6+ months of clean bridge operation under multisig, the admin role on AnetBridgeVault is renounced. Bridge becomes fully Model-2 (smart-contract, trustless). |
| 11 | AnetSwap hardening pass (v3.5 audit) | ✅ DONE May 28, 2026 |
Internal “Satoshi & Engineer Thanks” audit applied: Safe-multisig–compatible fee/withdraw via .call{value:}, paginated getPendingSwapsPaged() view, withdrawal & fee-forward events, graceful fee-forward fallback. See v3.5 changelog. |
Σ wANETall chains ≤ ANETlocked on L1 ≤ 21,000,000.
A-Network
Technical Whitepaper
A-Network operates a dual economic architecture: a closed-loop Layer 1 economy denominated in ANTS (utility-driven, participation-based) and an open-market Web3 economy on BNB Chain (market-driven, liquidity-accessible). Version 3.6 lands the AnetSwap governance hardening pass — the entry-side contract now mirrors the AnetBridgeVault administrative model: a 48-hour timelock with a 14-day execution-grace window on all parameter changes, a three-role split (admin / pauser / operator) so a compromised pauser cannot unpause and a compromised operator cannot move funds, and a 2-step transferAdmin/acceptAdmin handover. This closes the last single-key surface on the BNB Chain side. Version 3.5 (May 28, 2026) landed the AnetSwap correctness pass (Safe-multisig–compatible fee/withdraw path via .call{value:}, paginated indexer view, withdrawal & fee-forward events) following the internal “Satoshi & Engineer Thanks” audit. It carries forward Version 3.2's permanent milestone: on May 24, 2026 the ANET BEP-20 contract on BNB Chain (0x791055A7d52AA392eaE8De04250497f33807E46A) had its ownership permanently renounced (owner = 0x0000…0000). The functions mint(), pause(), unpause(), and setBlacklist() are now permanently disabled, locking maximum supply at 21,000,000 ANET forever. Version 3.1's bidirectional bridge remains intact: users can swap BNB, USDT, or USDC into ANET via the AnetSwap contract on BSC mainnet (0x1A1AFE5BF1ffDB64aC10958cCe2D06B22Fb47Fb8), and conversely burn Layer 1 ANET through the POST /bridge/burn endpoint on the ANET L1 node to receive wANET (BEP-20) on BSC from a dedicated escrow wallet. The lifecycle rule remains: mine first, complete 1,000 verified sessions, unlock mobile wallet execution for swap/transfer/cashout, then NFT profile is activated after first successful settlement event.
Version 3.6 — AnetSwap Governance Hardening
Version 3.6 lands the second half of the AnetSwap audit pass: the contract's administrative surface is now restructured to match AnetBridgeVault, retiring the single-owner() model in favor of a three-role split with a 48-hour timelock on every parameter change. This is the on-chain prerequisite for scorecard milestone #6 (AnetSwap multisig + timelock).
Governance model (new)
| Role | Recommended holder | What it can do | What it cannot do |
|---|---|---|---|
admin |
Gnosis Safe multisig (2-of-N) | Schedule + execute every parameter change after a 48h delay (fee bps, fee recipient, token configs, pauser rotation, operator rotation, unpause). Withdraw collected fees (admin-only, not timelocked — auth is the Safe quorum). Transfer admin via 2-step transferAdmin + acceptAdmin. |
Cannot bypass the 48-hour timelock, cannot mark a swap processed, cannot mint or move user assets that have not yet entered the contract. |
pauser |
Dedicated hardware-wallet hot key | Pause the contract instantly in an emergency. | Cannot unpause. Cannot change params, cannot move funds, cannot rotate any role. A compromised pauser can only DoS the contract until admin reopens via the 48h-timelocked executeUnpause. |
operator |
Backend hot wallet (pi-backend) | Call markProcessed / batchMarkProcessed to record L1 credit on processed swaps. No timelock (operational). |
Cannot move funds, cannot change params, cannot pause, cannot affect any swap that has not been credited on L1. |
Timelock semantics
TIMELOCK_DELAY = 48 hours— admin must wait this long afterschedule…()beforeexecute…()succeeds.EXECUTION_GRACE = 14 days— a scheduled change becomes permanently expired 14 days after its ETA. This prevents a stolen admin key from cashing in on a stale, community-tolerated schedule months later. Same primitive as the vault.- Bait-and-switch resistance —
execute…()takes the same arguments asschedule…()and re-hashes them withkeccak256(abi.encode(…)); any mismatch reverts. Admin cannot announce a benign value and execute a malicious one. - Cancellable — admin can drop any pending change via
cancelChange(id)at any point before execution.
API summary
- Timelocked param changes (schedule→wait 48h→execute):
FeeBps,FeeRecipient,ConfigureToken,Unpause,Pauser,Operator. - Instant (no timelock):
pause(pauser or admin),markProcessed/batchMarkProcessed(operator or admin),withdrawNative/withdrawToken(admin-only, destination hard-wired toadmin). - 2-step admin handover:
transferAdmin(newAdmin)proposes,acceptAdmin()finalises from the new address.transferAdmin(0)cancels. - Compatibility shim:
owner()still returnsadminso existing tooling (Etherscan “Read”, off-chain indexers, the v3.5 ABI) keeps working. - New events:
AdminTransferProposed,AdminTransferred,PauserUpdated,OperatorUpdated,ChangeScheduled,ChangeExecuted,ChangeCancelled.
Deployment & migration
- New constructor signature:
AnetSwap(admin, pauser, operator, feeRecipient). Deploy script (scripts/deploy.js) readsANET_BRIDGE_ADMIN,ANET_BRIDGE_PAUSER,ANET_BRIDGE_OPERATOR, falling back toANET_BRIDGE_OWNERthen to the deployer EOA. Each fallback emits a warning. - Token whitelist script (
scripts/setup-tokens.js) now runs in two phases:TOKEN_SETUP_PHASE=schedulestages every token change and writes a state file;TOKEN_SETUP_PHASE=executereplays them after the 48-hour delay. - The currently-deployed BSC contract
0x1A1AFE5BF1ffDB64aC10958cCe2D06B22Fb47Fb8is the v3.5 build. Migration to the v3.6 governance contract is on the roadmap and requires a fresh deploy + bridge-state migration. Until that ships, scorecard milestone #6 sits at In Progress (code complete, deploy pending).
Testing
37 new Hardhat tests cover the role split (pauser cannot unpause, operator cannot move funds, stranger cannot do anything), 48h timelock on every parameter, bait-and-switch resistance, the 14-day grace window, cancellation, and the 2-step admin handover. Combined with the 33 existing AnetBridgeVault tests, the contracts repository now passes 70/70 green.
Fee-on-transfer token accounting and entry-side rolling-24h caps remain on the backlog (carried over from v3.5) and will land in v3.7.
Version 3.5 — AnetSwap Hardening Pass
Version 3.5 documents an internal security & correctness audit performed on the AnetSwap entry-side contract and the immediate fixes that were applied. The audit was conducted under a deliberately adversarial frame — cryptographic rigor in the spirit of Satoshi Nakamoto, with engineering review for gas, ERC-20 edge cases, and DoS surface. The companion AnetBridgeVault (v3.3) was re-reviewed and required no code changes; its 2-of-3 EIP-712 release path, true 24-slot rolling cap accounting, high-s signature rejection, strictly-ascending unique-signer enforcement, and 48h admin timelock all passed without finding.
Fixes applied to AnetSwap.sol (BSC 0x1A1AFE5BF1ffDB64aC10958cCe2D06B22Fb47Fb8)
| Finding | Severity | Fix |
|---|---|---|
Fee/withdraw used .transfer() — the 2,300-gas stipend would brick every native swap the moment feeRecipient or owner became a Gnosis Safe. |
Medium | Switched to .call{value:}("") with success check. Fee forwarding now falls back gracefully: if the recipient refuses native coin, the fee is retained inside the contract and a FeeForwardFailed(token, recipient, amount) event is emitted — the user's swap is never reverted by an operator-side mistake. |
Unbounded loops in getPendingSwaps() and getSwapsBySender() — iterate the full historical swap array; eventually hit the block gas limit and break backend polling. |
Medium | Added getPendingSwapsPaged(startId, maxScan, maxReturn) with bounded scan/return windows and a nextStartId cursor. Legacy views retained for backwards-compatibility while the backend migrates. |
Silent owner withdrawals — withdrawNative / withdrawToken drained funds with no on-chain event trail for indexers or holders. |
Medium | Added NativeWithdrawn(to, amount) and TokenWithdrawn(token, to, amount) events on every withdrawal. (Timelock for these calls is tracked separately on the decentralization scorecard, milestone #6.) |
Outstanding hardening backlog (acknowledged, not yet patched)
- Fee-on-transfer / rebasing token accounting (Medium).
swapTokenForAnetcurrently uses the user-suppliedamountfor net accounting. Tokens that take a transfer tax would result in over-credit on Layer 1. Planned fix: measurebalanceOf(this)delta before/aftersafeTransferFromand credit the actual received amount. - Entry-side rolling caps (Medium). AnetBridgeVault enforces per-tx / per-recipient-24h / global-24h caps on the release side. AnetSwap currently has only per-token min/max. Planned fix: mirror the vault's rolling-24h pattern on the entry side so a backend compromise cannot be drained as fast as users send.
- Deployer key rotation (operational High). The plaintext
DEPLOYER_PRIVATE_KEY_BSCon the deployment workstation must be rotated to a hardware-wallet or Safe-owned deployer flow. Git history is clean (.envis gitignored and was never committed), but disk-resident plaintext is not the standard A-Network is held to.
Items confirmed sound (no change required)
- AnetBridgeVault EIP-712 domain pins
chainidat construction; release path verified end-to-end. - High-
srejection constant in_recoverequalssecp256k1_n / 2exactly. rescueOtherTokencannot be tricked into transferring the vault's own wANET (the token whosetransferis called is the passed token, not wANET).- Hardhat config refuses placeholder keys and refuses silent fallback — per-chain deployer key required.
- pi-backend has strict CSP, rate limits, IP allowlist on admin routes, and timing-safe admin-key comparison.
The fix commits and the full audit report are tracked in the contracts repository. The next whitepaper bump (v3.6) will record the fee-on-transfer and entry-side cap fixes, and milestone #6 (AnetSwap multisig + timelock) on the decentralization scorecard.
Abstract
A-Network v1.0.6 defines a proof-of-time ledger backed by fixed 6-hour Ant Work sessions and a live ANTS Mainnet. Session completion credits ANTS, the smallest accounting unit of the Layer 1 economy. Spendable Layer 1 ANET is not issued at session end and becomes claimable only after a participant reaches 1,000 completed sessions.
Today, mining accrual is performed exclusively through an authenticated server-side attendance check-in (POST /mining/start). The mobile app does not perform any on-device proof-of-work, hashing, or background compute — it simply opens a 6-hour attendance window and the backend updates the ledger. Phase 5 (decentralized signed SHA-256 proofs) remains on the research roadmap (see Section 11 — Phase 5 Roadmap) and is not active on the production network in v1.0.61 (123). When it ships, it will run alongside server-approved mining, not replace it.
The system uses two distinct assets. The Web3 utility token is a fixed-supply 21,000,000 ANET asset on BNB Chain. The Layer 1 coin economy uses ANTS as its operating unit and Layer 1 ANET as its settlement unit. One ANET = 100,000,000 Ants. This preserves precision and keeps the mining ledger compatible with future fee and settlement rules.
The Layer 1 mining schedule follows a Bitcoin-like halving rule with a preserved launch tranche. The first 500,000 total completed sessions use a launch output of 0.04882812 ANET-equivalent per session. After that tranche, the long-life schedule begins at 0.00262144 ANET-equivalent per session and halves only as the network reaches defined session milestones. Registration count, colony size, and wallet balance do not affect issuance.
The BNB Chain utility token is documented as a 50% / 50% founder stewardship pool, held between two named co-founders — @Joel_Dupalco (Coach Joel) and @Digitalgold1979 — for ecosystem utility, distribution planning, AMA rewards, liquidity provisioning, and Layer 1 access rails. As of May 24, 2026, the BEP-20 contract itself has no on-chain owner: the deployer wallet permanently renounced ownership, so the founders hold tokens as ordinary holders with no administrative privileges over the contract. By contrast, the Layer 1 mining coin has no owner allocation and no founder allocation: participants enter through work, not insider minting.
Once the mining hard cap is reached, the issuance engine enters an issuance-ended state. No further mining output is minted, no new issuance-bearing sessions start, and claim routes cannot create new Layer 1 ANET beyond the cap tracked by the mining ledger. The network remains active for identity, wallet continuity, migration, and future fee-based activity.
The roadmap currently targets a broader Layer 1 release window in roughly 8 months, subject to engineering readiness. Project planning may reference an illustrative early price zone around $0.000001 for initial Layer 1 market discovery, but that is not a guaranteed launch price and actual valuation will be determined by open market participation.
The live backend is also hardened for public-scale participation. Growth-critical counters and identifiers use 64-bit integer space, and registration is proxy-aware so users sharing the same carrier, school, office, or Render edge network are not falsely blocked purely because they appear behind a common upstream IP.
A-Network deliberately excludes referral-based issuance. Ant Codes are colony links only. They do not create coin bonuses, session credits, percentage commissions, or multi-level rewards. Every unit in the Layer 1 mining economy must arise from completed Ant Work sessions and pass through the governed claim flow.
Version 2.3 Protocol Update — Unified Miner Lifecycle Enforcement
Version 2.3 defines a single mandatory lifecycle for all participants and system modules. The objective is policy consistency across mining, DEX settlement, transfer access, and NFT identity utility. The rule is strict and global: mine first, complete 1,000 verified sessions, execute first successful authenticated settlement event, then unlock NFT profile capability.
Canonical Lifecycle Rule (v2.3)
- Miner Entry: User starts as a miner and accumulates participation through the standard 6-hour Ant Work cycle.
- Eligibility Unlock: User reaches the minimum 1,000 verified completed sessions threshold.
- Execution Event: User completes a valid, authenticated mobile wallet swap/transfer/cashout settlement event.
- NFT Activation: System activates (or allows activation of) ANET NFT profile identity only after that first successful settlement event is recorded.
State Machine Definition
| State | Condition | Allowed Actions | Blocked Actions |
|---|---|---|---|
| MINER_ONLY | Fewer than 1,000 verified completed sessions | Mine sessions, monitor progress, view web DEX pools/quotes/receipts | Swap execute, transfer, cashout, first-time NFT profile creation |
| ELIGIBLE_EXECUTION | At least 1,000 verified completed sessions, but no successful settlement event yet | Execute swap/transfer/cashout in authenticated mobile wallet flow | NFT profile first-time creation |
| NFT_ACTIVATED | At least one successful DEX execute/cashout settlement event recorded | NFT profile create/update, NFT asset create/edit, marketplace listing/bid/buy/close, domain auction | Bypass of market policy (ownership checks, listing checks, minimum rules) |
Protocol Invariants
- Invariant 1: NFT profile cannot be first-created before first successful settlement event.
- Invariant 2: Web DEX remains read-only for market data; settlement execution is mobile-wallet only under eligibility and security controls.
- Invariant 3: First successful DEX execute acts as NFT activation trigger for that ANET profile identity.
- Invariant 4: Marketplace ownership transfer only occurs through settled listing actions.
- Invariant 5: Domain-auction policy remains strict: .ant asset identity plus minimum bid threshold.
Protocol Invariants v1 (Canonical Production Set)
This canonical set defines non-negotiable production guarantees for settlement, cashout automation, and identity activation. Any implementation, upgrade, or operator action that violates these rules is considered non-compliant with protocol policy.
- PI-1 (Policy Gate): No swap/transfer/cashout settlement executes unless eligibility policy checks pass at execution time.
- PI-2 (Single Activation Trigger): First-time NFT profile activation occurs only after at least one successful authenticated settlement event.
- PI-3 (Execution Separation): Public web interfaces may expose market data and quotes, but authenticated execute paths remain wallet-gated.
- PI-4 (Idempotent Settlement): Duplicate payout execution for the same request identifier is forbidden across retries, restarts, and worker cycles.
- PI-5 (Dual Audit Evidence): Successful payout must produce both settlement-chain evidence (tx hash) and ANET activity evidence (
payout_sentevent). - PI-6 (Deterministic Queue State): Payout records transition only through valid states (
pending -> paid/failed/duplicate) and remain replay-safe after crashes. - PI-7 (Key Isolation): Production execution uses signed-only flow; seed phrase and private key material are never transmitted through public API requests.
- PI-8 (Risk Envelope): Hourly caps, per-user daily limits, reserve-ratio checks, and retry limits are mandatory controls, not optional runtime features.
NFT Marketplace Governance (v2.3)
The integrated marketplace supports fixed listings, auction listings, and domain-auction listings. Domain auctions are treated as a special policy class for identity namespace assets and include explicit constraints.
| Listing Type | Use Case | Core Rule | Settlement Path |
|---|---|---|---|
| fixed | Direct-price NFT sale | Ask price must be positive | Immediate buy action |
| auction | Timed competitive bidding | Minimum bid must be valid and increasing | Buy-now or close-to-highest-bid |
| domain-auction | .ant domain identity asset | Asset must map to .ant identity and bid floor policy applies | Timed auction with policy floor |
Implementation Notes for v2.3
- Automatic ingestion: payout candidates can be fetched from an authorized backend feed each worker cycle (no manual queue editing required in production mode).
- Queue as safety ledger: each payout moves through
pending -> paid/failed/duplicatestates, enabling crash recovery and replay-safe retries. - Idempotency:
request_idandswap_referenceare enforced to prevent double-settlement on retries or restarts. - Risk controls: hourly cap, per-user daily cap, reserve-ratio threshold, and wallet eligibility checks remain mandatory.
- Dual audit output: successful payout writes BSC transaction hash and an ANET on-chain
AppActivityevent (action=payout_sent). - Backend policy endpoint now exposes explicit NFT activation semantics in addition to no-burn and domain auction parameters.
- Public web DEX interfaces provide view and quote functions; execute functions are gated to authenticated mobile-wallet flows.
- DEX execute path records settlement request state and can auto-provision cashout-activated NFT profile identity if absent.
- NFT profile first creation gate validates cashout/swap activation condition instead of requiring pre-trade NFT registration.
- Marketplace list view supports board segmentation including domain-auction-focused board filtering.
Automated Cashout Pipeline (Production Addendum)
A-Network now operates an automated payout pipeline for cashout-eligible users. The design keeps execution automatic while preserving deterministic safety controls. Eligibility and settlement remain policy-gated, and every payout continues to produce an auditable trail across both networks.
Pipeline Guarantees
Future External Exchange Path
The v2.2 architecture remains compatible with future third-party rails (including centralized exchange and institutional integration models) by design. External channels are treated as integration layers on top of existing identity, listing, and settlement primitives rather than replacement logic.
- External listing/index APIs can mirror marketplace inventory while preserving on-platform ownership authority.
- Webhook/event relays can stream listing creation, bid settlement, and final transfer states to partners.
- Custodial buyer support can be added as an adapter layer without modifying core miner lifecycle invariants.
- Compliance overlays (regional, KYC, sanctions filters) can remain optional and integration-specific.
Introduction
The Failure of Web2
Most large Web2 systems treat user activity as platform-owned output. Time, attention, and behavioral data are monetized by the operator, while the participant typically receives neither ownership nor a verifiable claim on the resulting network value.
These systems also lack a common scarcity model and do not expose a public settlement layer. Participation may be measured internally, but it is not usually portable, auditable, or directly attributable to the participant in a durable ledger.
The Partial Solution of Web3
Web3 introduced public ownership records and programmable settlement. However, many systems remain capital-weighted, operationally complex, or vulnerable to Sybil behavior. Access often depends on prior wallet literacy, gas management, or direct capital exposure.
Ownership visibility alone does not solve the question of fair entry. A network may publish balances on-chain while still concentrating early access in a narrow class of participants.
The A-Network Proposal
A-Network proposes a staged system. The first stage uses a smartphone-accessible proof-of-time ledger. The second introduces public token visibility on BNB Chain. The third extends the ledger into a Layer 1 settlement environment. The long-term direction is ANET Core, where identity, governance, and application logic can be built on top of the participation record.
In this model, completed 6-hour sessions are the basic unit of contribution. The ledger is intended to persist across later phases rather than being discarded at each upgrade.
The Vision
A-Network is structured as a long-horizon infrastructure project. The present mobile ledger is treated as an entry layer, while later phases are intended to extend that ledger into broader settlement, fee, identity, and governance systems.
Core Principles
- Absolute Scarcity: The Layer 1 mining ledger is bounded by a 21,000,000 ANET cap. Once the final unit is reached, issuance halts and the system moves toward fee-based operation.
- Participation-First: Entry is based on time rather than hardware competition. The intended device class is the smartphone, not specialized compute equipment.
- Anti-Farming: Referral links do not amplify issuance. Colony tracking exists for coordination and attribution, not reward multiplication.
- Ledger Continuity: Web2 participation is intended to remain part of the migration record when later settlement layers are activated.
- Micro-Economic Precision: The Ant denomination preserves eight-decimal precision for settlement, fee accounting, and small-value transfers.
Web2 vs Web3 vs Web4 vs ANET Core
Coin Model — Utility Token + Layer 1 Mining Coin
A-Network separates its asset design into two linked but distinct layers. The first is the Web3 ANET utility token on BNB Chain, fixed at 21,000,000 ANET and held as a 50% / 50% co-founder stewardship pool between @Joel_Dupalco and @Digitalgold1979. The BEP-20 contract itself is ownerless as of May 24, 2026 (owner = 0x0); the stewards hold tokens but cannot mint, pause, or blacklist. The second is the Layer 1 mining economy, where users accrue ANTS through verified participation and become eligible to convert into spendable Layer 1 ANET only after the 1,000-session threshold.
The Web3 utility token serves as the ecosystem utility layer and an external access rail. The Layer 1 coin economy is intentionally different: it is specified as 100% mining-based, with 0% founder allocation and 0% owner allocation. The distinction is deliberate. Stewarded utility supply and miner-earned settlement supply are not treated as the same asset class.
| Parameter | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Web3 Asset | ANET Utility Token | BEP-20 ecosystem utility token on BNB Chain |
| Web3 Utility Supply | 21,000,000 ANET | Fixed utility-token supply |
| Web3 Stewardship | 50% / 50% co-founder | Held by @Joel_Dupalco and @Digitalgold1979 for ecosystem distribution, AMA rewards, and liquidity. No on-chain admin rights. |
| Web3 Contract Owner | 0x0000…0000 | Permanently renounced on May 24, 2026. mint(), pause(), unpause(), setBlacklist() disabled forever. |
| Layer 1 Asset | ANET / ANTS mining economy | Separate from the Web3 utility token |
| Genesis Threshold | 1,000 completed sessions | Non-spendable eligibility phase before conversion |
| Smallest Unit | 1 Ant | Like Bitcoin's Satoshi |
| Unit Ratio | 1 ANET = 100,000,000 Ants | 8 decimal places of precision |
| Precision | 8 decimal places | Stored as DECIMAL(20,8) in ledger |
| Layer 1 Founder Allocation | 0% | No founder mining reserve |
| Layer 1 Owner Allocation | 0% | No owner mining reserve |
| Layer 1 Distribution | 100% via mining | ANTS accumulate per session; spendable Layer 1 ANET begins after eligibility |
| Web3 Network | BNB Chain (Web3) | Contract: 0x791055A7d52AA392eaE8De04250497f33807E46A |
| Web4 Network | ANET Layer 1 | live ANTS Mainnet now; broader release targeted in roughly 8 months, subject to readiness |
| Initial Market Reference | ~$0.000001 | Illustrative early Layer 1 planning reference only, not a guaranteed launch price |
Ants — The Smallest Unit of ANET
In Bitcoin, the smallest indivisible unit is called a Satoshi (or Sat), where 1 BTC = 100,000,000 Satoshis. A-Network adopts the identical precision model but with its own cultural identity.
Canonical Asset Model — Bitcoin-Aligned
A-Network follows the exact same three-tier naming model as Bitcoin. There is one coin, one atomic unit, and one wrapped representation for external markets. These names are permanent and canonical.
| Role | A-Network | Bitcoin equivalent | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Native Layer 1 coin | ANET | BTC | Fixed supply of 21,000,000. Mined via verified Ant Work sessions. The economic identity of the network. |
| Smallest indivisible unit | ANTS (Ant) | Satoshi (sat) | 1 ANET = 100,000,000 ANTS. All ledger accounting, mining rewards, and L1 gas are denominated in ANTS. |
| Wrapped representation | wANET | WBTC / BTCB | 1:1 wrapped BEP-20 on BNB Chain, used for external liquidity, DEX routing, and cross-chain trading. Not the native coin. |
The total network supply is fixed at 21,000,000 ANET forever — expressed as 2,100,000,000,000,000 ANTS at the atomic level. wANET exists only as a 1:1 wrapped representation against the same fixed cap; it does not create additional supply.
wANET Multi-Chain Roadmap
wANET launches first on BNB Chain for the lowest fees, fastest finality, and broadest retail liquidity (PancakeSwap, BSC DEXs). Additional chains are on the roadmap and will only be deployed when each can be secured by the same AnetBridgeVault + multisig pattern. The Bitcoin-aligned invariant applies globally:
| Phase | Chain | Status | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 | BNB Chain (BEP-20) | Live — 0x791055A7d52AA392eaE8De04250497f33807E46A, ownership renounced May 24, 2026 | Lowest fees, fast finality, largest retail user base, mature EVM tooling. |
| Phase 2 | Ethereum (ERC-20) | Planned — after AnetBridgeVault deployment and third-party security audit | Institutional liquidity, CEX listings, deepest stablecoin markets. |
| Phase 3 | Base / Arbitrum (L2) | Planned — after Ethereum | Cheap ETH-aligned liquidity for retail. |
| Phase 4 | Solana | Under evaluation | Non-EVM; requires different bridge architecture (Wormhole / LayerZero pattern). |
| Phase 5 | TRON / others | Under evaluation | Regional retail and USDT-dominant markets. |
No new wANET can be issued on a new chain unless an equivalent amount is first burned on an existing chain (or newly locked on L1). Each chain receives a dedicated vault contract; the 21,000,000 cap is enforced globally, not per-chain. Multi-chain deployment will proceed only at a pace that preserves auditability and the bridge security model — not for marketing.
Definition: Ant
An Ant is the smallest indivisible unit of $ANET.
Transaction fees on the Web4 Layer 1 will be denominated in Ants — enabling sub-cent fee structures even at high ANET valuations. On-chain amounts will always display with full 8-decimal precision.
| A-Network | Equivalent | Bitcoin |
|---|---|---|
| $ANET | ≈ | BTC |
| Ant | ≈ | Satoshi (Sat) |
| 100,000,000 Ants | = 1 ANET | 100,000,000 Sats = 1 BTC |
| 21,000,000 ANET max | ≡ | 21,000,000 BTC max |
Supply Exhaustion & Hard Cap Enforcement
The MAX_SUPPLY constant is hardcoded in the Ant Work engine at exactly 21,000,000 ANET-equivalent units for the Layer 1 mining ledger. Session completion adds only ANTS to the user ledger. Supply protection becomes critical during claim, where a user's convertible ANET is capped so that totalANETClaimed can never exceed the mining-ledger cap.
In v1.0.6, hard-cap enforcement is not limited to conversion math. The live backend explicitly switches to an issuance-ended state when supply is exhausted: issuance-bearing session starts are refused, legacy minting routes return issuance-ended responses, and no new ANET can be created beyond the cap.
Dual Economic Architecture
A-Network operates two economically distinct systems that coexist without conflating their roles. Understanding the separation between them is essential to understanding how value, supply, and liquidity work in the network.
Layer 1 — Closed-Loop Utility Economy
The Layer 1 economy is denominated entirely in ANTS, the smallest unit of the network. All accounting, fee calculation, reward issuance, and session crediting happens in ANTS. There is no external price oracle or market feed in Layer 1; value is derived from utility, participation, and the network’s own fee and distribution mechanics.
- All session rewards are credited as ANTS.
- Mining output and fee models are defined in ANTS.
- The block explorer records ANTS-denominated balances and transactions.
- ANTS functions as the gas unit for the planned smart contract layer.
- Settlement/cashout can occur only through authorized bridge and DEX execution flow under policy controls.
Spendable Layer 1 ANET is a higher-denomination representation. 1 ANET = 100,000,000 ANTS. This ratio is fixed. Conversion from ANTS to spendable ANET is available once a participant reaches the 1,000-session genesis threshold.
Web3 — Open-Market Economy (BNB Chain)
The Web3 side of the ecosystem consists of a fixed-supply 21,000,000 ANET BEP-20 token deployed on BNB Chain. Unlike the Layer 1 economy, the Web3 token operates under open market conditions: its price is determined by decentralised exchange liquidity, order flow, and trader activity.
- Total supply: 21,000,000 ANET — fixed, no minting.
- Listed on DEX (PancakeSwap / BSC ecosystem).
- On-chain market data visible at: DexScreener → ANET/BSC
- The Web3 token provides external liquidity and market price discovery for ANET independent of the closed-loop Layer 1 system.
- Web3 token allocation follows a founder-stewardship model distinct from Layer 1 mining distribution.
Value Formation
Layer 1 Value Formation
Value in the Layer 1 economy is derived from utility, participation, and network usage. As more users mine, transact, and use smart contracts (Phase 4+), ANTS flow through the fee market. There is no external price feed; Layer 1 ANET value is anchored to the network’s own economic activity.
Web3 Value Formation
The BEP-20 ANET token’s value is determined by open market dynamics: buyer and seller activity on decentralised exchanges, liquidity depth, market sentiment, and broader BNB Chain ecosystem conditions. A-Network does not set or guarantee the Web3 token price.
User Transparency
- KYC: KYC is not required at the protocol level. External fiat on/off-ramp services, if used, may impose their own KYC requirements independently of A-Network.
- Web3 token risk: The BEP-20 ANET token operates under independent market conditions. Price, liquidity, and availability are not controlled by A-Network.
- Layer 1 and Web3 are separate: Holding or trading the Web3 BEP-20 token does not grant Layer 1 mining rewards, and Layer 1 mining does not guarantee Web3 token value.
- No buy-to-mine shortcut: Acquiring Web3 ANET does not unlock or mint native mined ANET; real Layer 1 coin participation remains tied to verified mining lifecycle and eligibility thresholds.
- Fee-based miner rewards: Eligible miners may receive protocol fee distributions tied to verified network activity and governance rules. These distributions are variable and are not guaranteed returns.
Smart Contract Vision
A planned future phase of A-Network (Phase 4 in the roadmap) introduces a smart contract layer directly on Layer 1. This section describes the architectural intent, the role of ANTS as gas, and the implementation approach under evaluation.
ANTS as Gas
In the planned smart contract model, ANTS serves as the gas unit for smart contract execution on Layer 1. This aligns execution cost with the native unit of the network’s economy, keeping fees denominated in the same asset used for mining rewards and balances.
- Every contract call consumes a defined quantity of ANTS as an execution fee.
- Gas fees flow back into the network’s fee distribution model, contributing to ecosystem sustainability.
- Miners and validators benefit from gas fee distribution in addition to block rewards.
- ANTS-denominated gas keeps the cost model independent of external token markets.
Implementation Approach
EVM Compatibility Evaluation
A-Network is evaluating EVM compatibility as the primary approach for the smart contract layer. EVM compatibility would allow existing Solidity tooling, developer ecosystems, and audited contract patterns to be used on A-Network Layer 1 without requiring a separate language or VM learning curve.
A custom VM approach remains under consideration as an alternative if EVM integration presents architectural conflicts with the Layer 1 consensus model.
Developer Tooling & SDK
Phase 4 implementation includes developer-facing SDK tooling, RPC endpoint access, and documentation for contract deployment on Layer 1. The block explorer will be extended to display contract state, transaction traces, and gas consumption.
Security-First Deployment
Smart contract deployment on Layer 1 will follow a staged rollout with independent security audits before public contract execution is enabled. No user funds or contracts will be activated on the production chain until audit criteria are met.
Web2 Phase — Time-Based Mobile Ant Work
The Web2 phase is the entry point into the system. It requires a smartphone and internet access, but no GPU mining, staking capital, or specialized hardware. In v1.0.6, the backend functions as a server-validated ledger that records time-based contribution, ANTS accumulation, eligibility progress, delayed ANET conversion, wallet continuity controls, migration-ready account state, the preserved 500,000-session launch tranche, and 64-bit-safe counters for public-scale participation.
The 6-Hour Ant Work Cycle
Ant Work in A-Network is structured around fixed 6-hour sessions. Each session is a discrete unit of validated participation. A user begins a session, waits 6 hours, and completes it. On completion, the ledger credits ANTS rather than immediately issuing ANET. The session duration cannot be shortened, and instant completion attempts are rejected.
Session Lifecycle
- Prerequisites Met: User must have verified email + created ANET wallet identity (and may optionally set a Web4 migration wallet address).
- Session Start: User taps "Start Ant Work". The server records
last_mining_start = NOW(), writes amining_sessionsrow, and setsis_mining = TRUE. If the network has already reached max supply, the start request is rejected with an issuance-ended response. - Active Phase (0–6 hours): Session runs server-side. App tracks countdown timer. Push notification is scheduled for the 6-hour mark.
- Completion Eligible (≥ 6 hours): The server validates elapsed time. Only sessions where
NOW() - last_mining_start ≥ 21,600 secondsare accepted. - Distribution Calculation: Halving stage is computed from total network sessions. Session output is calculated as an ANET-equivalent amount, then credited to the user ledger in ANTS.
- Session Reset:
is_mining = FALSE. User can immediately start next session.
Session Capacity Rules
Daily and Account Limits
- Max cycles per day: 4 completed sessions per account per calendar day.
- Session duration: exactly 6 hours of server-observed elapsed time.
- No overlap: an account cannot begin a second session while one is active.
- Eligibility threshold: users become eligible to convert ANTS into ANET after 1,000 completed sessions.
- Counter safety: user IDs, session IDs, successful session totals, and network-wide session counters use 64-bit ranges to avoid overflow at public-scale adoption.
- Timestamps tracked: the backend stores per-session start and completion records for audit, analytics, and abuse detection.
Prerequisites for Ant Work
| Requirement | Purpose | Enforcement |
|---|---|---|
| Email Verification | Sybil resistance — one real person per account | OTP verification required before first session |
| Wallet Setup | Bind each miner to a unique ANET wallet identity and optional Web4 migration address | Generate Wallet is required before mining; migration wallet can be saved for future Layer 1 migration |
| Device Binding | Reduce duplicate-account and automation abuse | Device ID is required before mining is allowed |
| Single Active Session | Prevents parallel session farming | is_mining flag; duplicate start returns error |
| Daily Cycle Cap | Stops 24/7 API farming and keeps mining cadence predictable | 4 sessions per day enforced at the database/session log level |
| Rate Limiting | API abuse prevention | Global limit baseline 100 requests / 15 minutes per IP, with stricter route-level limits on sensitive actions |
App Delivery & Monetization
The mobile client also contains delivery infrastructure that is operationally useful but economically secondary. Notifications and advertising do not alter the distribution rules. The backend remains the sole source of truth for ANTS crediting, session eligibility, and ANET conversion.
Operational Client Stack
- Local Session Notifications: The app schedules a local notification at session start for the expected 6-hour completion time, then shows an immediate completion notification after session credit posts successfully.
- Server Notification Fallback: The backend runs a 60-second worker plus dashboard fallback checks so missed client notifications can still be marked and processed server-side.
- AdMob Integration: Google Mobile Ads is initialized in the Flutter app with banner, interstitial, and rewarded inventory support.
- Live Placement Policy: The current mining flow uses banner and interstitial placements while mining output remains fully backend-calculated. Rewarded inventory exists in the shared ad service for controlled rollout rather than as an alternate accounting ledger.
- Runtime Control: Ads can be globally disabled with
ADS_ENABLED=falseand switched between production and test units with build-time flags such asUSE_TEST_ADS=true.
Session Halving — The v1.0.6 Launch-Tranche Distribution Formula
A-Network v1.0.6 preserves the original launch economics for the first 500,000 total completed sessions, where each completed 6-hour session earns 0.04882812 ANET. After that launch tranche, the long-life schedule begins at 0.00262144 ANET per session and halves each time the network reaches another 3,800,000,000 post-launch sessions. The controlling variable is total verified network activity.
This design keeps the curve predictable and auditable. A user cannot alter the reward stage through colony size, coin purchases, or wallet size. Reward progression is driven only by aggregate proof-of-time across the network.
Dashboard interpretation: current mining output can be displayed in ANTS because ANTS is the smallest live accounting unit of ANET. Users may also see an estimated ANET equivalent, but the ledger source of truth during Web2 remains ANTS accumulation until claim eligibility is reached.
The Halving Level Formula
Important metric distinction: Eligibility and halving are now separate concepts. A user becomes eligible to convert after 1,000 sessions, but halving progression is driven only by totalSessions at the network level.
Threshold Milestones to the Next Halving Stage
Complete Distribution Table
The v1.0.6 distribution table preserves the original launch economics for the first 500,000 total sessions, then moves onto a slower post-launch curve. There is one launch tranche followed by ten post-launch stages, from Stage 0 to Stage 9, with each post-launch stage halving the session output.
| Halving Stage | Total Sessions Threshold | Trigger Rule | ANET / Session | Ants / Session | Direction | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Launch Tranche | 0 - 499,999 | First 500,000 total sessions | 0.04882812 ANET | 4,882,812 Ants | Preserved launch session output | Launch Rate |
| Post-Launch Stage 0 | 500,000 - 3,800,499,999 | Total sessions remain below 3,800,500,000 | 0.00262144 ANET | 262,144 Ants | Upgraded long-life base output | Post-Launch |
| Stage 1 | 3,800,500,000 - 7,600,499,999 | Total sessions reach 3,800,500,000 | 0.00131072 ANET | 131,072 Ants | First post-launch halving | Upcoming |
| Stage 2 | 7,600,500,000 - 11,400,499,999 | Total sessions reach 7,600,500,000 | 0.00065536 ANET | 65,536 Ants | Second post-launch halving | Upcoming |
| Stage 9 | 34,200,500,000+ | Total sessions reach 34,200,500,000 | 0.00000512 ANET | 512 Ants | Final capped post-launch halving stage | Capped |
Sessions Required to Exhaust Supply
Anti-Gaming, Fraud Detection & Enforcement
Because issuance depends on verified sessions, the mining ledger must assume attempted automation, multi-accounting, and session manipulation. The defensive model is layered: preventive controls, risk scoring, heartbeat validation, pattern detection, and admin enforcement.
Layer 1 — Preventive Controls
| Attack Vector | Defense Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Bot sessions | 6-hour server-validated timer + heartbeat verification + risk scoring and audit logs |
| Multiple accounts per person | Email OTP verification + device binding with configurable device account cap (default: 2) |
| Parallel session farming | is_mining boolean prevents starting second session |
| Daily farming loops | Maximum 4 sessions per user per day |
| Colony distribution farming | Ant Codes are tracking-only; zero distribution amplification |
| Instant completion attempts | Server rejects completion before the full 6-hour window and flags suspicious behavior |
| Over-minting | Hard supply cap enforced during ANET conversion; conversion truncates to remaining supply |
| Wallet ownership integrity | Each account has a unique ANET wallet identity and can save a migration wallet for Web4 |
| Unverified accounts | email_verified check on start/complete; suspicious attempts are flagged and logged |
| Session spoofing / inactivity | Server validates last_heartbeat gap and minimum heartbeat count before reward completion |
| Risk-heavy claims | Claim is blocked if account is flagged or risk score exceeds configured threshold |
| Login from new device or IP | Smart OTP risk detection: unrecognized device_id, new IP address, or is_trusted_device = FALSE triggers a 6-digit email OTP before JWT is issued |
| OTP brute force | Maximum 5 OTP attempts per OTP code; 5-minute expiry; account locked from OTP after exceeding limit |
| Concurrent session double-claim | SELECT ... FOR UPDATE row lock inside a database transaction on every session claim prevents parallel requests from crediting ANTS twice |
| Late claim abuse | 2-hour grace window: claims after 8h from session start are rejected as missed sessions |
| Banned accounts | Accounts with is_banned = TRUE are blocked from starting sessions, completing sessions, claiming session credit, and claiming ANET conversion |
These controls are intended to block the most common abuse paths before reward calculation occurs. They do not replace later checks; they reduce the number of invalid sessions that reach later stages of the pipeline.
Layer 2 — Real-Time Risk Scoring Engine
Every mining action passes through a multi-signal evaluation pipeline that computes a cumulative risk score per account. When that score reaches a configured threshold, mining actions are blocked. Risk points persist across sessions.
Security Signal Evaluation
The current implementation evaluates the following signals before allowing a mining action to proceed:
- Device Fingerprint Presence: Missing fingerprint → +2 risk points
- Fingerprint Format Validation: Invalid or malformed fingerprint → +2 risk points
- Device ID Presence: Missing device ID → +1 risk point
- Device ID Consistency: Mismatch between header and body device ID → +3 risk points
- Runtime Validation: Unexpected runtime mode → +1 risk point; missing runtime header → +2 points and action blocked
- Emulator / Rooted Device: Detected insecure runtime → +5 risk points and action blocked (configurable:
BLOCK_INSECURE_RUNTIME)
At the default threshold of 5 points (configurable through ANTI_ABUSE_RISK_BLOCK_THRESHOLD), mining actions are blocked and the account is flagged for review.
Dynamic Risk Evaluation per Session
Risk evaluation also continues during the session lifecycle:
- IP Cluster Risk: If the user's IP address is shared by 8+ accounts → +2 risk points (configurable:
IP_CLUSTER_ACCOUNT_THRESHOLD) - Device Cluster Risk: If the user's device is linked to more accounts than allowed → +1 per excess account, +4 if exceeding hard limit (configurable:
DEVICE_MAX_ACCOUNTS) - Fingerprint Cluster Risk: If the user's fingerprint is shared by 4+ accounts → +2 risk points (configurable:
FINGERPRINT_CLUSTER_ACCOUNT_THRESHOLD) - Bot Pattern Risk: If 4+ sessions show identical start times or perfect duration patterns → +2 risk points (see bot detection below)
Layer 3 — Heartbeat Validation & Bot Pattern Detection
Active sessions are monitored through a heartbeat protocol. The server tracks heartbeat timing and count for each session. Sessions that diverge from the expected pattern may be flagged or terminated.
Heartbeat Validation Rules
- Maximum Heartbeat Gap: If the gap between the last heartbeat and the current time exceeds 120 minutes, the session is terminated with status
invalid_heartbeat(configurable:MINING_HEARTBEAT_MAX_GAP_MINUTES) - Minimum Heartbeat Count: Sessions running 6+ hours must have at least 2 heartbeats recorded. Sessions with fewer are rejected (configurable:
MINING_HEARTBEAT_MIN_REQUIRED)
Bot Pattern Detection
The backend scans recent session history for two common automation signatures:
- Identical Start Times: 4+ sessions with start times within a 2-minute window of each other → suspicious automation pattern
- Perfect Duration Pattern: 4+ sessions with completion times falling within a narrow 21,300–21,900 second band (5.92–6.08 hours) → robotic precision inconsistent with human behavior
A positive match adds risk points and surfaces the account for review.
Layer 4 — Security Audit Logging
Significant mining events are recorded in a dedicated security_audit_logs table. The log is intended for forensic review and enforcement support.
| Field | Contains |
|---|---|
| event_type | Categorized action (mining_start, mining_complete, mining_heartbeat, mining_start_blocked_insecure_runtime, mining_complete_blocked_heartbeat, session_claim_blocked_insecure_runtime, claim_blocked_sessions, etc.) |
| user_id | Account ID of the actor |
| session_id | Mining session reference (if applicable) |
| ip | IP address at time of action |
| device_id | Client-reported device identifier |
| device_fingerprint | Client-reported device fingerprint hash |
| risk_points | Risk score accumulated during this action |
| details | JSONB payload with structured metadata (reasons, thresholds, session context) |
| created_at | Timestamp of the event |
The audit log is indexed by user_id, event_type, and created_at. Admin endpoints surface these records alongside user profiles.
Suspicious Activity Tracking
In parallel with the risk score, a separate suspicious_flags counter records explicit rule violations per account.
Events That Increment Suspicious Flags
attempt_start_without_email_verification— Unverified account tried to start miningattempt_start_without_wallet— Account without wallet tried to start miningmissing_device_binding— No device binding on mining startduplicate_active_session_start— Tried to start a second parallel sessiondaily_session_limit_exceeded— Exceeded the 4 sessions/day capattempt_complete_without_email_verification— Unverified account tried to complete sessionattempt_complete_without_active_session— Complete request with no active sessionheartbeat_invalid— Failed heartbeat validation (also triggers risk flag)attempt_early_completion— Tried to complete before 6 hours elapsed
Layer 5 — Fraud Cluster Detection & Bot Cleanup
The backend also provides admin-only endpoints for cluster analysis and cleanup. These tools are not fully automatic; they are intended to support manual investigation and controlled enforcement.
Fraud Cluster Analysis
Three cluster queries identify shared infrastructure patterns that may indicate multi-accounting:
- IP Clusters: Groups of 3+ active accounts sharing a single IP address, ranked by cluster size (top 50)
- Device ID Clusters: Groups of 2+ active accounts sharing the same device identifier (top 50)
- Fingerprint Clusters: Groups of 2+ active accounts sharing the same device fingerprint hash (top 50)
Cluster appearance is not itself a conviction rule. Results are returned to an admin and require review before enforcement.
Bot Cleanup System
A preview-and-apply cleanup pipeline identifies accounts that match automated farming heuristics. The automated cleanup target is limited to unverified accounts matching one or more of the following rules:
- Stale Unverified: Unverified account with no sessions, no claimed ANET, and registered more than 72 hours ago
- IP Farm: Unverified account on an IP shared by 8+ accounts
- Device Farm: Unverified account on a device shared by 3+ accounts
- Fingerprint Farm: Unverified account on a fingerprint shared by 4+ accounts
- Flagged + Low Activity: Unverified account that is either flagged or has risk score ≥ 8, with ≤ 1 session and no claimed ANET
Execution requires a confirmation token (DELETE_SUSPICIOUS_UNVERIFIED_USERS). Affected accounts are soft-deleted and any active sessions are cancelled.
Verified Account Review
Email-verified accounts with fraud indicators are surfaced separately for manual review. Verified accounts are not auto-deleted, but they may be flagged for investigation when they match:
- Risk score ≥ 8 or
is_flagged = TRUE - Device cluster size ≥ 2 accounts
- Fingerprint cluster size ≥ 3 accounts
- IP cluster size ≥ 12 accounts
- 4+ sessions with identical start times (within 120 seconds)
- 4+ sessions with robotic duration pattern (near-identical completion times)
Admin Dashboard — Eligible Users & Cheater Detection
Admin users identified by ADMIN_USER_IDS have access to a restricted dashboard suite through the /admin route prefix. All admin endpoints require JWT authentication and explicit admin verification.
Eligible Users Dashboard (GET /admin/dashboard)
Displays users who have reached or exceeded the 1,000-session eligibility threshold. Each record includes:
- Account ID, email, and registration date
- Total
successful_sessionsand actual verified completed sessions (cross-referenced frommining_sessionstable) - Current ANTS balance, claimed ANET total
- Wallet addresses (ANET wallet + custom wallet)
- Flagged status, ban status, and risk score
- Device ID, country, and last activity timestamp
A summary panel also reports eligible count, claimed count, banned count, and flagged count.
Cheater Detection Engine (GET /admin/cheaters)
Runs five independent detection heuristics across the user base and returns categorized results:
- Inflated Sessions: Users whose
successful_sessionscount exceeds their actual verifiedmining_sessionscompleted count — indicating historical session inflation or database manipulation - High Risk Score: Users with
risk_score ≥ 5, sorted by severity — accounts that have accumulated risk points from security signal violations - Suspiciously Fast Sessions: Users with 3+ sessions completed in under 5.5 hours — physically impossible under the 6-hour session rule, indicating potential time manipulation
- Daily Limit Abuse: Users who have completed more than 4 sessions in a single calendar day at any point — indicating bypass of the daily session cap
- Multi-Account Device Clusters: Devices shared by 2+ accounts, with full account details per cluster — indicating multiple accounts operated from the same device
Results are returned with user context sufficient for enforcement review.
User Deep Investigation (GET /admin/user/:id)
Provides a detailed profile view for an individual user under review:
- Profile Data: Email, sessions, balance, claim status, wallet addresses, country, device identifiers, flagged/banned status, risk score, suspicious flags history
- Session History: Last 50 mining sessions with start time, end time, duration (hours), reward amount, halving level, heartbeat count, flagged status, completion status, and start/completion IP addresses
- Audit Trail: Last 30 security audit log entries showing event types, IP addresses, device IDs, risk points, and detailed JSONB metadata
Account Ban & Enforcement System
The ban system is manual. No user is permanently banned by an automated rule. The system provides both ban and unban operations for admin use.
Ban Mechanics (POST /admin/ban)
When an admin bans a user, the system performs the following actions:
- The user's
is_bannedflag is set toTRUE - A
banned_attimestamp andban_reasontext are recorded - The user's
is_miningflag is immediately set toFALSE - Any active mining sessions are cancelled (status set to
cancelled,is_completed = FALSE) - The admin cannot ban their own account (self-ban protection)
What Banned Users Cannot Do
- ⌠Start a new mining session (
POST /mining/start) - ⌠Complete a mining session (
POST /mining/complete) - ⌠Claim session rewards to ANTS balance (
POST /mining/session/claim) - ⌠Convert ANTS to ANET (
POST /mining/claim)
Banned users receive a suspension response on protected mining actions.
Unban Mechanics (POST /admin/unban)
Admins can reverse a ban if review concludes that the account was flagged incorrectly or the restriction should be lifted. Unbanning clears the is_banned flag, banned_at, and ban_reason.
Mining Session Statuses Reference
Every mining session in the mining_sessions table carries a status that reflects its lifecycle outcome:
| Status | Meaning | How It Occurs |
|---|---|---|
active | Session is currently in progress | User started mining; 6-hour timer running |
completed | Session successfully completed and rewarded | User completed after ≥ 6 hours with valid heartbeats |
invalid_heartbeat | Session terminated due to heartbeat failure | Heartbeat gap exceeded 120 minutes or insufficient heartbeat count |
blocked_high_risk | Session terminated due to high risk score | User's risk score exceeded the block threshold during the session |
network_inactive | Session terminated because network mining was paused | Global is_mining_active flag was set to FALSE |
max_supply_reached | Session terminated because max supply was hit | 21,000,000 ANET hard cap was reached during this session |
cancelled | Session forcefully cancelled | Admin ban, bot cleanup, or manual session reset |
Configuration Reference
All anti-abuse thresholds are configurable via environment variables, allowing the network operator to tune sensitivity without code changes:
Web3 Phase — BNB Chain Integration
Web3 serves as the utility and visibility bridge between the Ant Work ledger and external crypto infrastructure. In the current system, Web2 remains the source of truth for sessions and ANTS accumulation, while BNB Chain provides public contract visibility, wallet references, and the external utility token used for longer-term access planning.
ANET Token Contract
Contract Details
| Contract Address | 0x791055A7d52AA392eaE8De04250497f33807E46A |
| Network | BNB Smart Chain (BSC) — Chain ID: 56 |
| Standard | BEP-20 |
| Decimals | 8 (matching Ant precision) |
| Total Supply | 21,000,000 ANET |
| Documented Stewardship | 50% / 50% co-founder — @Joel_Dupalco and @Digitalgold1979 for ecosystem distribution |
| Contract Owner | 0x0000…0000 — permanently renounced May 24, 2026 |
Wallet Identity & Migration Address
Each account can create a unique ANET wallet identity in-app. This wallet is linked to the miner profile and is used to display the user's currently claimed ANET coins while also preserving tracked ANTS for migration visibility.
Users can also save a separate migration wallet address for future Web4 Layer 1 migration. This allows migration planning ahead of chain launch while preserving mining continuity and future identity portability.
Users connect a Web3 wallet address only as a destination for controlled distributions or migration routing. A Network does not store private keys and does not ask for seed phrases to define wallet ownership. In the current release, wallet continuity is protected by layered controls: an optional wallet PIN, encrypted server-side seed continuity storage for in-app wallet recovery, email OTP verification before seed reveal, and backward-compatible local fallback support for older users whose legacy seed was never migrated to encrypted storage.
Current Wallet Behavior
- Generate Wallet: Generates a unique ANET wallet identity for each user account.
- Check Balance: Shows claimed ANET coin balance and tracked ANTS derived from the Web2 ledger.
- Set Migration Wallet: Optional address field for future Web4 migration routing.
- Wallet PIN: Users can set, change, or recover a 4-8 digit wallet PIN through email OTP verification.
- Seed Recovery Flow: Seed phrase reveal requires a valid wallet PIN and an email OTP; legacy plaintext seed records are migrated on-demand into encrypted vault fields before reveal.
- Legacy Device Fallback: If no encrypted server seed exists, the app can fall back to older local device backups after verification.
- Web3 Role: BNB Chain contract remains the ecosystem utility and visibility layer while Web4 Layer 1 is prepared.
- Utility Token Function: The Web3 token is intended to support ecosystem access and buy-in rails for the future Layer 1 economy.
v3.0 — In-App EVM Bridge (AnetSwap)
Version 3.0 (May 2026, app v1.0.21+71) introduces a fully self-contained EVM bridge inside the mobile wallet. Users can swap BNB, USDT, or USDC directly into ANET on BSC mainnet without leaving the app and without installing MetaMask or any external wallet.
AnetSwap Contract — BSC Mainnet
| Contract Address | 0x1A1AFE5BF1ffDB64aC10958cCe2D06B22Fb47Fb8 |
| Network | BNB Smart Chain (BSC) — Chain ID: 56 |
| Bridge Fee | 1% (100 bps, collected on-chain) |
| Whitelisted Tokens | BNB (native), ANET, USDT, USDC, WBNB, BUSD |
| Entry Functions | swapNativeForAnet(string) payable | swapTokenForAnet(address,uint256,string) |
Bridge Flow (v1.0.21+71)
- Select token: BNB, USDT, or USDC inside the DEX → EVM Bridge tab
- Enter amount: App shows live BSC balance and estimated ANET received after 1% fee
- Confirm: PIN session gate — transaction signed locally with BIP44 m/44′/60′/0′/0/0 derived key, never transmitted
- Broadcast: Signed TX sent to BSC via
bsc-dataseed1.binance.org - Backend notify: App posts
txHashto pi-backend bridge endpoint, which credits ANET on Layer 1 - Polling: App polls every 6 s until Layer 1 credit is confirmed; swap recorded in local history
- Explorer: Every bridge swap visible at explorer.a-network.net
v3.1 — L1 → BSC Return Bridge (Burn Endpoint)
Version 3.1 (May 2026) closed the bridge loop. The ANET Layer 1 node exposes POST /bridge/burn, allowing a user to burn native Layer 1 ANET in exchange for an equivalent amount of wANET (BEP-20) on BSC mainnet. Each burn is authorized by a signed action authorization (ECDSA over the user’s L1 wallet key), recorded immutably on the L1 chain, and exposed through GET /bridge/burns for off-chain consumption. Version 3.3 (May 25, 2026) hardens the release side: wANET is no longer disbursed by a trusted relayer key but instead by the on-chain AnetBridgeVault contract (0x31438362a7667ce5559500023D025c7c14168B49), which requires a 2-of-3 EIP-712 signature threshold from independent self-hosted signers before any release. The relayer process retains only the gas-paying submitter role and has no signing authority; see § v3.3 below.
L1 Burn Bridge — Production Parameters
| L1 Endpoint | POST /bridge/burn | GET /bridge/burns (admin-key gated) |
| Bridge Vault (BSC) | 0x31438362a7667ce5559500023D025c7c14168B49 — AnetBridgeVault smart contract, deployed May 25, 2026. BscScan. |
| Legacy Escrow (BSC) | 0x27766A070e6F55BD832A10aB9c5931FfA2037029 — original hot-EOA escrow. Being drained to the vault; retained here for historical traceability only. |
| Escrow Asset | wANET BEP-20 (0x791055A7d52AA392eaE8De04250497f33807E46A) · gas in BNB |
| Relayer Service | anet-bsc-relayer — polls L1, signs BSC transfer, reports completion back to L1 |
| Activation Gate | Server-side feature flag ANET_BRIDGE_BURN_ENABLED (default off). When disabled the endpoint returns a deterministic 404 with a typed error code. |
| Replay Protection | Unique per-user nonce + L1 burn-record uniqueness check before relayer release |
0xB65B30…6184F into AnetBridgeVault (0x31438362…14168B49) and is now custodied under the 2-of-3 EIP-712 multi-signer policy. The vault total (post-deposit) is ~10,499,898.02 wANET, independently verifiable via vaultBalance() on BscScan. The mirror deposit from @Digitalgold1979 (the other 50%) is the next planned step; the L1 burn endpoint remains gated behind the ANET_BRIDGE_BURN_ENABLED flag pending the mirror deposit and final operational readiness. Until then, users continue to use the BSC → L1 direction (AnetSwap) only. Founder address activity · Vault activity.
v3.3 — AnetBridgeVault (2-of-3 EIP-712 Smart-Contract Bridge)
Version 3.3 (May 25, 2026) removes the bridge from the trusted-relayer model and pins it to an on-chain smart contract with an independent multi-signer policy. The previously hot-EOA wANET escrow has been replaced by AnetBridgeVault, a one-way-sink contract whose release function requires a 2-of-3 EIP-712 signature threshold from three independent, self-hosted signers. The bridge submitter wallet pays gas only and holds no signing authority; it cannot release a single wANET on its own. Even the vault admin cannot remove wANET from the contract: an explicit rescue guard reverts on the vault asset, making wANET strictly one-way-in for non-burn paths.
v3.3 AnetBridgeVault — Production Parameters
| Vault Contract | 0x31438362a7667ce5559500023D025c7c14168B49 · deployed BSC mainnet, May 25, 2026 · BscScan |
| Vault Asset | wANET BEP-20 (0x791055A7d52AA392eaE8De04250497f33807E46A) — ownership permanently renounced (v3.2 milestone) |
| Signer Set (2-of-3) | 0xa5d1968E…88CE7 (Termux daemon on mobile device), 0xCBe8d5EA…dD71FE (macOS laptop), 0xdC744663…CAb748 (Fly.io worker, Singapore region) — three independent hosts spanning OS family, geography, and hosting provider; no two keys co-reside on the same machine. Operator independence is on the v3.5 roadmap: at least one signer slot will rotate from a founder-operated host to a co-founder-operated host via the on-chain 48h-timelocked signer rotation flow, restoring full bitcoin-principle operator independence (no single human controls the threshold). |
| Release Authorization | EIP-712 typed-data digest over Release(uint256 burnId, string l1Sender, address recipient, uint256 amount, uint256 deadline). Domain separator (chainId 56) verified on-chain at 0x511e5b0a…a4fc6. |
| Signature Aggregation | The L1 node exposes POST /bridge/burns/:id/sigs for ecrecover-verified signature collection and GET /bridge/burns/:id/sigs for the relayer to fetch aggregated signatures. L1 holds zero signing power — it is a verification bulletin board only. |
| On-Chain Caps | 10,000 ANET per release tx · 50,000 ANET per recipient per rolling 24h · 250,000 ANET global per rolling 24h. Enforced by the contract; cannot be bypassed by any off-chain actor. |
| Burn-ID Dedup | The vault tracks consumed burn IDs on-chain. A second release of the same burn ID reverts deterministically. |
| Canonical Deadline | Each burn carries a canonical release_deadline (default 86,400 s) set on L1 at burn time. Expired signatures are unusable on-chain. |
| Admin Powers (Strictly Bounded) | Admin (0x54A65c28…0CC74) can schedule cap changes (48h timelock), schedule signer-set rotations (48h timelock), and pause via the dedicated pauser (0x8030e2D8…F7BD5). Admin cannot: mint wANET, release wANET, bypass signers, or rescue the vault asset. |
| Self-Hosted Signer Client | anet-vault-signer — standalone open-source daemon (Node.js, ethers v6). Each signer independently re-derives the EIP-712 digest from L1 data and refuses to sign on any mismatch (vault address, chain id, signer-set membership, deadline, amount cap). Signers do not trust L1's digest. |
Web4 Phase — ANET Layer 1 Blockchain
A-Network now operates a live ANTS Mainnet that extends the ANTS-first Web2 ledger into an on-chain settlement environment. The ANTS Mainnet chain bootstraps genesis from the Web2 ledger, synchronizes activated balances into Layer 1 state, and opens wallet-to-wallet settlement windows on a 2-second cadence. A block is produced only when chain work exists, such as a queued transfer or newly synchronized ANTS supply from Web2. The broader production-grade Web4 activation remains a future milestone subject to engineering readiness and security review.
This should not be understood as a token swap. It is a ledger synchronization and chain-genesis model. On the live ANTS Mainnet, wallet state, completed-session history, and activated ANTS balances from the Web2 database are imported into the Layer 1 genesis snapshot and may continue receiving periodic delta settlements while the chain is running. The first 1,000 completed sessions remain the threshold before spendable Layer 1 ANET conversion begins.
The Layer 1 coin model is designed so that spendable network coin begins with miners. There is no founder mining reserve and no owner mining reserve. Users who reach the threshold can convert mined ANTS to Layer 1 ANET and participate in wallet-to-wallet settlement on the chain. The separate Web3 utility token is intended to complement that flow rather than substitute for miner-earned Layer 1 issuance.
Time-Based Proof-of-Work (TPoW)
Traditional Proof-of-Work systems rely on computational expenditure and therefore tend to favor specialized hardware operators. A-Network attempts a different entry rule.
Its Time-Based Proof-of-Work (TPoW) replaces computational expenditure with committed time. In the Web2 phase, the work unit is a verified 6-hour session. In the Live ANTS Mainnet, settlement windows are decoupled from that off-chain work interval and reopen every 2 seconds, while blocks are emitted only when transfers or synchronized ANTS supply exist. Validator eligibility continues to derive from real Web2 session activity.
Hybrid TPoW + PoS — the Live Mainnet model
Following the Bitcoin precedent, A-Network does not run a separate testnet. The Layer 1 reachable at explorer.a-network.net is the production Mainnet. Consensus pairs two independent signals:
- TPoW (entry) — eligibility is earned through verified 6-hour mining sessions on commodity smartphones. ASIC-resistant and capital-resistant by construction.
- PoS (finality) — once a participant crosses the 1,000-session genesis threshold, accumulated ANTS → ANET stake can be bonded to operate a validator and sign settlement blocks. Slashing applies to equivocation and downtime.
Every block must reference both a TPoW participation root and a PoS signature set. Neither side can fork the chain alone. Layer 1 has no founder allocation and no premine; every ANET on L1 originates from a mined ANTS session. This is the structural path to full decentralization: capital cannot buy in without time, and time cannot ship blocks without stake.
Accountable Operators (Pre-Validator-Set)
Until the open validator registry is live (Phase 3, in progress), infrastructure is run by publicly named operators. There are no anonymous core multisig holders. The first step in “don’t trust, verify” is knowing who to hold accountable.
- Joel Dupalco (Coach Joel) — co-founder, L1 protocol, backend, bridge signer #1, 50% BEP-20 steward · @Joel_Dupalco
- Khurram Zahid (Digital Gold) — co-founder, bridge signer #2, 50% BEP-20 steward, mobile release & iOS/Android signing (Apple Team ID
L792KSQ9VC), Play Store / TestFlight delivery · @Digitalgold1979
As validators come online the operator set rotates from named individuals to a permissionless validator registry, and the multisig threshold expands beyond 2-of-3.
TPoW vs Traditional PoW Comparison
| Property | Bitcoin PoW | A-Network TPoW |
|---|---|---|
| Work Unit | Hash computation (SHA-256) | Time commitment (6 hours verified) + synchronized Layer 1 settlement |
| Hardware | ASIC miners ($10k–$100k) | Any smartphone |
| Energy | Enormous (gigawatts) | Negligible (background app) |
| Sybil resistance | Hash rate cost | Email verification + time cost |
| Block time | ~10 minutes | 2-second settlement windows on live ANTS Mainnet; blocks are created only when transfers or new synchronized supply exist, while 6-hour Web2 mining sessions remain separate |
| Reward model | Block reward + fees | Web2 session issuance off-chain; Layer 1 transfer blocks are fee-ready and settlement-focused |
| Decentralization | Hardware-limited | Smartphone-universal |
Phase 5 (Roadmap): Decentralized Mining Proofs — Research Spec
POST /mining/start). The mobile application performs no on-device hashing, proof-of-work, background compute, or cryptocurrency mining. This section is preserved as a forward-looking specification for community review.
When activated, Phase 5 will enable miners to create cryptographically-signed proofs without relying on centralized server approval. Miners would generate proofs locally using a time-based difficulty challenge, sign them with their secp256k1 private key, and submit them directly to the chain. Any validator could then independently verify these proofs using public cryptography.
Proof-of-Ownership Model
Traditional mining servers act as gatekeepers. Phase 5 replaces this model with cryptographic proof of ownership: a miner proves they control their wallet by signing a proof with their private key. This signature is verifiable by any node without contacting a central authority.
| Aspect | Server-Approved Mining | Decentralized Proofs (Phase 5) |
|---|---|---|
| Who Approves | Central mining server | Community validators |
| Proof Format | Session completion record | Signed proof hash with witness nonce |
| Verification | Server logic | Public secp256k1 cryptography |
| Wallet Proof | Implicit (server trust) | Explicit signature recovery |
| Replay Protection | Session ID uniqueness | Persistent nonce tracking (per wallet) |
| Availability | Server dependent | Distributed across validators |
Proof Generation Algorithm
Miners generate proofs by finding a SHA256 hash with a specified number of leading zero bits, without requiring network communication:
timestamp_ms = now_utc_ms()
base_payload = format!("{miner}|{timestamp_ms}|")
for nonce in 0..max_iterations {
payload = format!("{base_payload}{nonce}")
hash = sha256(payload)
leading_zeros = count_leading_zero_bits(hash)
if leading_zeros >= difficulty return hash
}
return null
}
Proof Signing and Verification
Once a proof hash is generated, the miner signs it with their secp256k1 private key using a canonical signing format. The signature proves wallet ownership without revealing the key. Validators verify the signature and difficulty independently:
Proof Verification Checklist
- Signature Recovery: Recover the signer's wallet address from the ECDSA signature
- Wallet Match: Recovered wallet must equal the claimed miner wallet
- Difficulty Check: Proof hash must have ≥ N leading zero bits
- Nonce Uniqueness: Nonce must not have been used before by this miner (persistent DB check)
- Chain ID Match: Proof must be for the current blockchain
- Hash Validity: SHA256 hash must be correctly formatted (hex, lowercase)
Proof Inclusion in Blocks
Accepted proofs are buffered in-memory and automatically included in the next block. Validators keep proofs for up to 5 minutes; older proofs are discarded. Proofs appear in the block's tpow_proofs array alongside transactions.
Backward Compatibility
Phase 5 is fully backward compatible. The server-approved mining endpoint (POST /mining/complete) remains fully functional. Miners choose which model to use: decentralized proofs or server approval. This dual-mode design ensures no disruption to existing mining operations.
Security Model
No Central Authority
Miners are sovereign proof generators. They sign their own proofs and submit to any validator node. No central server needed for proof acceptance.
Cryptographic Proof of Ownership
The secp256k1 signature proves the miner controls the wallet without requiring the server to verify anything. Signature recovery is deterministic public cryptography.
Distributed Verification
Any validator node can independently verify proofs using the same public verification algorithm. No trust in a single entity required.
Replay Protection
Each proof includes a nonce (witness counter). The chain persists nonce usage in a database, ensuring the same proof cannot be submitted twice by the same miner, even across node restarts.
Supply Model Unchanged
Phase 5 does not modify the issuance schedule or supply cap. The total supply remains 21,000,000 ANET (hard-coded, immutable). Phase 5 only changes who approves proofs (community validators instead of a server); it does not change how much is issued.
Block Structure on ANET Layer 1
On the live ANTS Mainnet, each block represents a settlement event rather than a 6-hour mining window. Validator eligibility is still derived from completed Web2 mining participation, while wallet-to-wallet transfers settle inside short 2-second windows. If no transfer and no newly synchronized Web2 supply arrives in a window, no block is emitted. The block contains:
Transaction Fees — Paid in Ants
After the max supply of 21,000,000 ANET is reached, no new ANET is created. The long-term network transitions from a block-reward model to a fee-only model. The live ANTS Mainnet already exercises the settlement side of this design by opening 2-second transfer windows, emitting event-driven settlement blocks, tracking validator sets, and accounting for transaction fees in Ants.
How Transaction Fees Work in Web4
- Any ANET transfer on the Layer 1 chain requires a small fee denominated in Ants.
- Fees accumulate only when transfers are actually included in a settlement block.
- At block close, all validators recorded in that settlement block are eligible to split the fee pool equally — regardless of when they registered or how many total sessions they have.
- Pro-rata distribution: If 10,000 miners completed TPoW in a block and 5,000,000 Ants were collected in fees, each miner receives 500 Ants for that block.
- No minimum stake required. Every verified miner with a completed session is eligible.
- Full ANTS role: Ants are the unit for fees, block-level accounting, micro-payments, and miner settlement accounting across Layer 1.
In the application dashboard, ANET supply and ANTS supply can both be shown side by side. This gives users a clear view of whole-token economics and smallest-unit accounting at the same time.
Web2 → Web4 Migration Specification
The migration from the Web2 PostgreSQL ledger to the Web4 Layer 1 blockchain is the most critical operation in A-Network's history. It must be transparent, verifiable, and zero-loss. Every wallet identity, migration wallet, ANTS balance, claimed ANET total, and session count must be preserved exactly.
Migration Process — Step by Step
- Migration Snapshot Window: The Web2 ledger exports a signed snapshot of all participating users, including
wallet_address,migration_wallet_address,ant_balance,claimed_anet, andsuccessful_sessions. - Eligibility Mapping: Users who have reached the migration threshold of 1,000 sessions can be marked as fully eligible migration participants, while lower-session accounts remain auditable in the snapshot for future governed treatment.
- Genesis Block Construction: The ANET Layer 1 genesis block is constructed from the signed snapshot. Each user's approved migration mapping, ANTS-derived state, and claimed ANET settlement become part of the initial state tree.
- Live ANTS Mainnet Proof: The current ANTS Mainnet already demonstrates this model through genesis activation plus periodic Web2 delta synchronization into the running chain.
- Chain Launch: The genesis block is sealed, hashed, and broadcast to the validator set synchronized from eligible miners who meet current node thresholds.
- Verification Period: A 30-day public verification window allows any participant to audit their balance against the published snapshot.
- Full Activation: After verification, the Layer 1 chain is opened for transactions, smart contracts, and fee mining.
Ledger Re-Organization — Last Miner First
The genesis state of the Web4 chain can be populated from the Web2 database using a recent-activity-first synchronization order. This favors the latest verified state while minimizing downtime for miners who remain active near migration.
Why Reverse-Chronological Sync?
The design rationale is threefold:
- Activity Incentive: Miners who are still actively participating at the moment of max-supply are most likely to be the foundation of the Web4 validator set. They are synchronized first to minimize their downtime.
- Chain Integrity: The most recent balances represent the most up-to-date, accurate state of the ledger. Starting from the latest state and working backward ensures the genesis block reflects reality.
- Sybil Protection: Long-dormant accounts with zero recent activity (suggesting bot or abandoned accounts) are synchronized last, reducing their influence on the initial chain state.
ANET Core — Web5 Layer
ANET Core is the long-term Web5 layer of the A-Network design. If Web4 provides chain settlement, ANET Core is intended to provide the identity, governance, and application layer built on top of that settlement base.
In this document, ANET Core is treated as a protocol direction rather than a completed product. Its purpose is to extend participation history into identity, governance, and application access.
Core Features
1. Decentralized Identity (DID)
Every A-Network participant who has completed at least 1,000 mining sessions qualifies for a self-sovereign identity — a cryptographically verifiable on-chain identity linked to their mining history. This DID is:
- Not controlled by any company or platform
- Portable across all ANET Core applications
- Backed by on-chain session history (proof-of-participation)
- Used for governance voting, dApp access, and reputation scoring
2. Community Governance
Mining history becomes governance weight. Miners with more completed sessions (and by extension, more ANET earned through genuine participation) have proportionally more influence in protocol upgrades, parameter changes, and ecosystem fund allocation.
- Proposal threshold: Minimum 100 successful sessions to submit governance proposals
- Voting weight: Proportional to verified session count (not raw coin balance, preventing whale dominance)
- Timelock: All approved protocol changes include a minimum 7-day timelock before execution
3. dApp Ecosystem
ANET Core functions as an application platform. Developers can deploy decentralized applications that:
- Use ANET as native currency (fees in Ants)
- Verify user identity through DID without centralized data storage
- Access the ANET Core identity graph for reputation-gated features
- Integrate with the mining history ledger for proof-of-participation requirements
AI Integration Layer
ANET Core also contemplates a protocol-level AI layer that would enable:
- Personal AI agents — owned by the user, not a corporation. AI models run on the user's data without exporting it to centralized servers.
- Federated learning — AI models improve from participant contributions without centralizing training data.
- On-chain AI inference market — Participants can offer AI compute services and earn Ants for processing inference requests.
- ANET Support Bot — An initial AI assistant built on the ANET Core identity layer, accessible to all miners for ecosystem guidance.
Ant Code Colony System — Mining Gateway And Colony Coordination
A-Network includes a single-level colony system that acts as an entry and coordination structure. The live backend does not implement pyramid rewards, commissions, session credits, or multi-level returns. Ant Codes link colony membership, miner identity, and community structure only.
What the Ant Code Colony System Does
- Acts as the gateway for contributors who want to enter the network through real mining participation
- Tracks who joined whose colony (one level deep only)
- Organizes miners, builders, and supporters into colony groups for accountability and coordination
- Counts how many of your direct colony ants have completed ≥ 1,000 sessions
- Displays your personal session progress toward the 1,000-session level milestone
- Supports Colony Points (CP) and social graph metrics as participation signals rather than passive entitlements
What the Ant Code Colony System Does NOT Do
- ⌠No coin rewards for referring
- ⌠No session credits or session distributions for referring
- ⌠No recurring session distributions per colony activity
- ⌠No session multipliers
- ⌠No multi-level (F2, F3...) chains
- ⌠No influence farming via colony counts
The purpose of this design is to keep growth metrics separate from issuance. Colony membership is intended to represent active miners and contributors rather than passive spectators. Colony Points (CP) are participation metrics, not monetary claims. The system records who activated whom, but the ledger depends on each participant's own verified session history.
Security Model
Email + Wallet Address together.
Authentication Architecture
The authentication model combines bearer-token access, device-aware checks, and OTP-based challenge flows for elevated-risk actions.
- JWT Tokens: All protected API endpoints require Bearer token authentication. Tokens are issued after password or OTP verification, signed with a 7-day lifetime, and enforced with explicit expiration validation.
- Session Binding: Every issued token is bound to
session_nonce,device_id, anddevice_fingerprint. Middleware rejects copied or stale tokens when nonce or device context no longer matches stored session state. - Email OTP (Registration): Account activation requires OTP verification during registration.
- Smart Login OTP: On login, the server evaluates device and IP risk. If risk is detected, a 6-digit email OTP is required through
POST /auth/verify-login-otp. - Trusted Device Management: Devices become trusted after successful OTP verification. Subsequent logins from the same device may bypass OTP unless the IP context changes. OTP attempts are capped.
- One-Time Account Restore: If an account is in the scheduled-deletion state, the owner can request an email OTP through
POST /auth/account-restore/requestand confirm it throughPOST /auth/account-restore/confirm. This recovery path is intentionally single-use. - Rate Limiting: Global baseline 100 requests per 15 minutes per IP, with additional route-specific throttles for auth/mining actions.
- Protected Session Status: Mining status endpoints require authentication and user-ownership checks; cross-account status queries are denied.
- IP Logging: Last IP recorded per user for anomaly detection (not persisted in history, only current).
- Multilingual Responses: API error and success messages are localized to the user's
preferred_language. English (en) and Filipino (tl) are the launch locales. - Rejected-Token Audit Trail: Failed token validations are logged as
auth_token_rejectedevents with device and IP context for forensic review.
Database Security
The database security model emphasizes hashed secrets, encrypted recovery material, constrained admin access, and parameterized queries.
- Passwords stored as bcrypt hashes (minimum 10 rounds) — plaintext never stored.
- Wallet identity is generated and linked at account level with server-validated uniqueness constraints.
- Wallet PIN values are stored only as bcrypt hashes; plaintext PINs are never stored.
- Seed phrase vault data is stored encrypted at rest using encrypted seed, IV, and authentication tag fields; legacy plaintext seed values are migrated on-demand and then removed.
- Seed reveal requires both the wallet PIN and a time-limited email OTP, with retry caps enforced server-side.
- Seed phrase should still be stored offline by the account owner after initial backup; server-assisted recovery is a continuity control, not a substitute for self-custody discipline.
- PostgreSQL with parameterized queries throughout — SQL injection surface is zero.
- Admin endpoints are controlled by explicit environment flags and administrative key validation; production disables bootstrap/test admin flows by default.
- Ban operations are auditable: every ban records the admin who executed it, the timestamp, and the reason. Unban operations clear the record entirely.
Execution Surface Policy
A-Network separates information access from execution authority. Public web clients are intended for transparency and discovery, while authenticated mobile wallet flows are required for state-changing operations.
- Web (public): pool visibility, pricing, quote inspection, and receipt export.
- Mobile wallet (authenticated): swap execution, transfer, and cashout operations after 1,000-session eligibility.
- Policy objective: enforce miner-first onboarding, preserve anti-abuse controls, and avoid unauthenticated execution paths.
Ledger Integrity
Ledger integrity depends on precision-safe storage, transactional mutation, and row-level locking around reward-sensitive operations.
DECIMAL(20,8)balance type for legacyant_balance; a parallelants_balancefield stored asBIGINTis used for precision-safe integer arithmetic.- All session claim operations are wrapped in a database transaction with row-level locking (
SELECT ... FOR UPDATE) to prevent concurrent double-credit of ANTS from parallel API calls. - Backward-compatible ledger repair: on login and migration,
ants_balanceis set toGREATEST(existing, sessions × 4888)— never reduced, never overwritten unsafely. - Database-level triggers ensure
updated_atis always accurate. - Cascade delete protections on mining session foreign keys.
- All balance changes are atomic SQL transactions — partial credit is impossible.
Session Lifecycle
The session model also includes explicit timing rules for claim windows, notification handling, and dormant-account cleanup.
- Session End Time: Every session claim sets
session_end_time = NOW() + 6hfor the next session window, enabling exact grace-period enforcement. - Grace Period: 2-hour grace window after the 6h session window closes. Claims received between 6h and 8h are accepted. Claims after 8h are flagged as missed sessions.
- Notification Worker: A 60-second server interval worker polls for users whose
session_end_time ≤ NOW()andnotification_sent = FALSE, triggering completion processing and dashboard failsafe updates even if the client missed the local reminder. - Dormancy Cleanup: A background cleanup service may soft-delete accounts that have never claimed any ANET and have zero completed session history, after 90+ days of inactivity. This only affects genuinely empty/abandoned accounts — accounts with any claimed ANET balance or any session history are never affected. Users receive an in-app notification prior to any dormancy action, and any ANTS returned to the ecosystem ledger come only from accounts with zero recorded earnings.
Roadmap
Official Links
Layer 1 Block Explorer
Monitor Layer 1 transactions, wallet balances, and block activity on the official A-Network explorer.
Web3 Market — ANET on BNB Chain (DEX)
Real-time price, liquidity, and trade activity for the BEP-20 ANET token on BNB Chain.
Website & Documentation
- https://a-network.net — Main site
- https://a-network.net/whitepaper.html — This whitepaper
- Privacy Policy
- Terms of Service
Legal Disclaimer
Company Information
A-Network is operated by A Network LLC, a California limited liability company. California Entity No. 20260170159. Initial business filing approved on April 15, 2026.
This whitepaper is provided for informational purposes only. Nothing in this document constitutes financial advice, investment advice, or a solicitation to purchase any digital asset. Participation in A-Network mining involves risks including but not limited to: technological risk, regulatory risk, and market risk.
The ANET coin is a utility coin within the A-Network ecosystem. It is not a security, does not represent equity in any company, and does not entitle the holder to any dividend, profit share, or management rights.
The development timelines, technical specifications, and feature descriptions in this whitepaper represent current plans and intentions. They are subject to change as the project evolves. No guarantee is made regarding any specific future feature, capability, timeline, financial return, or controlled distribution outcome.
A Network does not guarantee financial returns. All values, metrics, and distributions described here are based on participation, system rules, and network conditions. The platform is designed for ecosystem participation, not speculative investment.
Users are responsible for complying with all applicable laws and regulations in their jurisdiction. A-Network does not represent that participation is legal in any specific jurisdiction. Always conduct your own research (DYOR).
By using the A-Network application or holding ANET, you acknowledge that you have read and understood this disclaimer.
Full legal documents: Privacy Policy · Terms of Service · Account Deletion